

CURRICULUM VITAE

1. PERSONAL DETAILS

Email: inbaltalgam@gmail.com, italgam@tauex.tau.ac.il

Website: <http://www.inbaltalgam.com/>

Phone: +972-54-4304650

2. RESEARCH AREAS

(+) Algorithmic game theory (+) Incentives in AI and machine learning (+) Economics and computation (+) Computer science, law and policy.

3. EDUCATION

Computer Science:

- *PhD, Stanford University: 2016.*
Dissertation: “Robust Market Design: Information and Computation”.
Committee: Tim Roughgarden (advisor), Ashish Goel and Ramesh Johari (computer scientists), Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson (economists and Nobel laureates).
- *MSc, Weizmann Institute: 2010.*
Dissertation: “Approximate Nash Equilibrium: A Direct Reduction”.
Advisor: Uriel Feige.
- *BSc, Tel Aviv University: 2006.*

Law:

- *LLB, Tel Aviv University: 2006.*
Bar: 2007.

4. APPOINTMENTS

Academic:

- *Tel Aviv University:* Since 2024, I am an **Associate Professor** at the School of Computer Science. I lead the **AGENT Group** (Algorithmic Game and Economic Theory). Since 2026, I also lead the **Technology Lab** at **CARRD, the Center for Applied Research on Risks to Democracy**.
- *Technion:* In 2018-2023 I was a **Senior Lecturer** at the Computer Science Faculty. In 2023 I moved to Tel Aviv University, maintaining a **Visiting Faculty** position at the Technion.
- *Hebrew and Tel Aviv Universities:* In 2016-2018 I was a **Marie Curie Postdoctoral Fellow** and an **I-CORE (Israeli Center of Research Excellence) Fellow**, jointly hosted by Michal Feldman and Noam Nisan.

Law: In 2006-2007 I clerked for Justice Esther Hayut of the **Supreme Court of Israel**.

Industry: I was a research intern at **Microsoft Research** and **Yahoo! Labs**.

Military: I served as an officer in the **Intelligence Corps**.

5. GRANTS (SELECTED)

1. **ERC: Algorithmic Contract Design (ALGOCONTRACT).** Individual starting grant, NIS 5,600,000, **2023-2028**.
2. **ISF: Contract Design, Machine Learning and Statistical Inference.** Individual grant, NIS 880,000, **2024-2028**.
3. **NSF-BSF: Algorithmic Persuasion.** In collaboration with Yakov Babichenko and Haifeng Xu, NIS 900,000 (my share), **2021-2024**.
4. **ISF: Complexity in Markets – Beyond Worst-Case Analysis.** Individual grant, NIS 840,000, **2018-2022**.

6. AWARDS (SELECTED)

1. **Microsoft AI Economy Institute (AIEI) Senior Fellow, 2025 Fall Cohort** (NIS 293,000).
Selected among hundreds of candidates, the **Cohort** brings together exceptional global expertise to provide insights for AI policy in academia, industry, and government. Through a series of workshops, research papers and a book publication, the Cohort seeks to accelerate understanding of how GenAI is transforming education, labor and economy across sectors and geographies.
2. **AI Security Institute (AISI) 2025 Alignment Project** (NIS 213,600).
Our project “Mitigating Moral Hazard in AI Using Contracts” selected for acceleration as “groundbreaking AI alignment research” that will keep advanced AI systems safe, secure and beneficial to society. The **Alignment Project** is supported by “an international coalition of government, industry, and philanthropic funders —

including the UK AI Security Institute, the Canadian AI Safety Institute, Schmidt Sciences, Amazon Web Services, Halcyon Futures, SafeAI, and the UK Advanced Research and Invention Agency.”

3. **Krill Prize** (NIS 36,000).
Awarded in 2023 by the *Wolf Foundation* for excellence in scientific research. The prize is “bestowed upon individuals who have demonstrated remarkable research breakthroughs”. The recipients are “anticipated to play pivotal roles in leading research and academia in Israel in the future.”
4. **Google Research Scholar Award** (NIS 211,000).
Google’s highly competitive, prestigious award for supporting cutting-edge research pursued by accomplished young faculty. I was among five recipients globally in 2022 in *Algorithms and Optimization* (only recipient to win in this category from a non-U.S. university).
5. **ACM SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award** to Konstantin Zabarnyi, my first PhD student, for his thesis “*Information Design in the Twenty-First Century: A Computer Science Perspective*”. Awarded in 2025. “Konstantin’s dissertation makes substantial contributions to a wide variety of topics in the field of economics of information. His thesis initiates [algorithmic cheap talk](#) and provides powerful insights on a broad range of aspects related to information design and Bayesian persuasion.”
6. **ACM SIGecom Doctoral Dissertation Award** to my PhD thesis “*Robust Market Design: Information and Computation*”. Awarded in 2016. With my student Konstantin Zabarnyi, we are the [first advisor-advisee pair](#) to both win this award, a decade apart.
7. **ACM SIGecom Best Student Paper Award** to my paper *Why Prices Need Algorithms*, ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2015.
Also invited as a plenary talk to the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC) TheoryFest, 2017, and to the Best Papers from Sister Conferences Track at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2016.

7. FELLOWSHIPS & HONORS (SELECTED)

8. **Henry Taub Prize for Academic Excellence** (NIS 105,000).
Awarded in 2022 for “substantial and unique achievements” and “exceptional excellence in research”.
9. **Leaders in Science and Technology Taub Fellow** (NIS 82,000).
Awarded by the *Taub Family Foundation*, 2018-2020.
10. **European Union Marie Curie Fellow** (NIS 340,000).
The EU’s “most competitive and prestigious” research and innovation fellowship. Awarded by the *European Commission*, 2016-2017.
11. **Hsieh Family Stanford Interdisciplinary Graduate Fellow** (NIS 418,090).
“One of the highest awards given to doctoral students pursuing interdisciplinary research.” Awarded by the *Stanford Interdisciplinary Graduate Fellowship Program*, 2013-2015.
12. **Academy of Achievement Delegate**.
“The world’s most accomplished young scholars” engage with leaders in government, business, science and the arts. I was a delegate in 2014, endorsed by Nili Priel and Ehud Barak.
13. **China Theory Week Invitee**.
Brings together “the 20 most accomplished PhD students within theoretical computer science worldwide”. I was invited to participate in 2013.
14. **Google Anita Borg Scholar** (NIS 35,872).
Awarded in 2010 by Google for demonstrating exceptional academic and leadership qualities.

8. TEACHING

- *Algorithms*: Computer science undergraduate course, taught yearly since 2019.
- *Algorithms for Rational Agents*: Advanced course developed and taught yearly since 2019 (title varies).
- *Machine Learning, AI and Incentives*: Seminar developed and taught yearly since 2019 (title varies).

9. SCIENTIFIC LEADERSHIP

Editorial Boards and Committee Chairing (Selected)

1. **Associate Editor**, SIAM Journal on Computing (SICOMP), 2024-. Top journal in computer science.
2. **Steering Committee Member**, Northwestern CS+Law Workshop Series, 2022-.
3. **Track Chair**, Theory Track, ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2024.
4. **Area Chair**, Mechanism and Contract Design, ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2022.
5. **Program Committee Co-Chair**, Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), 2021.
6. **Editor-in-Chief**, ACM SIGecom Exchanges 2020-2022. Curating the best research in algorithmic game theory.

7. **STOC Program Committee Member**, 2019, 2021, 2025, 2026.
8. **Chair of Evaluation Committee**, [Breakthrough Research Program](#), Ministry of Innovation, Science and Technology, 2026.

Organizer (Selected)

AI

1. [Workshop on Incentive-Based AI Alignment](#), ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2026. Co-organizers: Nicole Immorlica, Eden Saig, and Alex Smolin.

Algorithmic Contract Design

1. [Workshop on Algorithmic Contracts and AI Alignment](#), Northwestern CS+Law Series, 2024. Co-organizer: Katrina Ligett, Hebrew University.
2. [Workshop on Algorithmic Contract Design: Present and Future](#), ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2022. Co-organizer: Paul Dütting, Google Research.
3. [Tutorial on Contracts as a New Frontier for Algorithmic Game Theory: Part I](#), ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2019. Most watched tutorial on ACM SIGecom's YouTube channel, with **3.4K views**.

Computer Science, Law and Policy

4. [6th Annual ACM SIGecom Winter Meeting on Algorithmic Game Theory, AI and Law](#), 2026. Co-organizer: Rachel Cummings, Columbia.
5. [Workshop on Algorithmic Collusion](#), Northwestern CS+Law Series, 2025. Co-organizer: Yannai Gonczarowski, Harvard.
6. [Kickoff Workshop on Algorithms, Law and Policy](#), Simons Institute, Berkeley, 2020. Co-organizers: Niva Elkin-Koren, Michal Feldman, and Shafi Goldwasser.
7. *Dagstuhl Seminar on Algorithms, Law and Policy*, 2020. Cancelled due to COVID-19.

Talks (Selected)

1. **Invited speaker**, *Moral Hazard in AI Delegation*, ICML Workshop on New Frontiers in Game Theoretic Learning, Seoul, 2026.
2. **Semi-plenary**, *Incentivizing Quality AI with Statistical and Adaptive Contracts*, Highlights Beyond EC, Rome, 2026 (talk given by Eden Saig).
3. **Invited speaker**, *Algorithmic Contract Design: Recent Progress*, Workshop in Honor of Prof. Yisrael Aumann, Hebrew University, 2026.
4. **Keynote**, *Algorithmic Contract Design: Recent Progress*, Fundamentals of Computation Theory (FCT), University of Wroclaw, 2025.
5. **Keynote**, *Pay for Performance: When Algorithms Call the Shots*, Academia Nation, Tel Aviv, 2025.
6. **Invited speaker**, *Game Theoretical Approaches to the Israeli Judicial Reform*, 14th Israeli Game Theory Conference, 2025. Cancelled due to the Iran-Israel war.
7. **Invited speaker**, *Statistical Contracts for Incentivizing GenAI*, ALGA (Algorithms, Learning, Games), Sardinia, 2025.
8. **Invited speaker**, *Incentivizing Quality Text Generation via Statistical Contracts*, AAI Workshop on Economics of Modern ML, Philadelphia, 2025.
9. **Colloquium**, *Algorithmic Contract Design: Recent Progress*, Ben-Gurion University, 2025.
10. **Keynote**, *Contract Design: Algorithms and Learning*, Workshop on Algorithms for Learning and Economics (WALE), 2024.
11. **Invited speaker**, *Reinforcement Learning with Contracts*, AI Week, Tel Aviv, 2024.
12. **Keynote**, *Making the Most of It: An Algorithmic Approach to Effort*, ECGI Workshop, Yale, 2024.
13. **Colloquium**, *Contract Design: Approximation and Learning*, Weizmann Institute, 2024.
14. **Keynote**, *Contract Design: Approximation and Learning*, Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE), Shanghai, 2023.
15. **Plenary**, *Contract Design: Approximation and Learning*, International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, 2023.
16. **Invited speaker**, *Incentivizing Effort under Uncertainty*, Workshop in Honor of Noam Nisan, 2022.
17. **Tutorial**, *Algorithmic Contract Design*, STOC TheoryFest Workshop, Rome, 2022.
18. **Plenary**, *Contract Design with Uncertainty*, Hi! Paris Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Society, 2022.
19. **Invited speaker**, *Algorithmic Contract Theory*, TCS+ Seminar Series in Theoretical Computer Science, 2022.
20. **Plenary**, *Auctions with Interdependent Values*, Inaugural SIGecom Winter Meeting in Honor of Nobel Laureates Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson, 2021.

21. **Keynote**, *Beyond Auction Theory: Economic Models for Computational Advertising*, AdKDD, ACM Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Conference), 2020.
22. **Plenary**, *Contract Theory: An Algorithmic Approach*, Israel Algorithmic Game Theory Day, 2020.
23. **Invited speaker**, *Beyond Worst-Case Analysis in Algorithmic Game Theory*, FeigeFest, Weizmann, 2020.
24. **Plenary**, *Beyond Worst-Case Analysis in Algorithmic Game Theory*, FOCS Workshop, Baltimore, 2019.
25. **Plenary**, *The Complexity of Contracts*, MAPLE, Politecnico di Milano, 2019.
26. **Plenary**, *Algorithms and Law*, Simons Institute Workshop on Beyond Differential Privacy, Berkeley, 2019.
27. **Plenary**, *Simple vs. Optimal Contracts*, STOCA Workshop at Google, Mountain View, 2019.
28. **Invited speaker**, *Approximate Modularity Revisited*, Highlights of Algorithms (HALG) Conference featuring “important contributions of a wider interest to the algorithmic community”, Amsterdam, 2018.

10. OUTREACH (SELECTED)

- **In the press**: [Yedioth Ahronoth and YNET](#), [YNET](#), [Yedioth Ahronoth and Geektime](#), [Private Investigators](#).
- **Mind-IL organizer**: [Israeli Science and Academia Week](#), [Computer Science Conference](#), 2026.
- **Expert opinion** on a bill amending *Basic Law: The Judiciary*: Submitted and presented at the Knesset.
- **SLMath summer school lead organizer**: [Market and Mechanism Design](#), Berkeley 2023. A 40-year series of math schools for international students. Co-organizers: Yannai Gonczarowski, Irene Lo and Ran Shorrer.
- **SafeToC steering committee**: Preventing and combating harassment in the Theory of Computing community.
- **Arabs and Jews on Campus**: Initiative of the Equality and Diversity Commission at TAU, following 7.10.23.
- **Global outreach** program at WINE’21.
- **Editor-in-Chief of the ACM Student Magazine** [XRDS](#): All-student editorial board, 40,000 subscribers.

11. RESEARCH GROUP

Current

Postdocs: Roi Bar-Zur, Shiri Ron, Shaul Rosner

PhD students: Tal Alon, Zohar Barak, Batya Berzack, Omri Porat, Gilad Shmerler

MSc students: Roy Abend, Idan Bloch, May Hamari, Tamar Lachover, Elad Lavi, Yael Tolkovsky

Alumni

Postdocs: Ganesh Ghalme, Xin Huang, Dima Ivanov

Graduated PhDs: Konstantin Zabarnyi

Graduated MScs: Gil Aharoni, Ameer Amer, Nir Bachrach, Zohar Barak, Batya Berzack, Tamar Garbuz

Visitors: Magdalen Dobson, Chang Wang, Eden Saig

12. PUBLICATIONS

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(I). Monographs, Book Chapters, Surveys

- B1. Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. **Survey: Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design**. *Annual Review of Economics* 11, 355-381, 2019.
- B2. Inbal Talgam-Cohen. **Book Chapter: Prior-Independent Auctions**. *Beyond the Worst-Case Analysis of Algorithms*, Cambridge University Press, 2020.
- B3. Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. **Monograph: Algorithmic Contract Theory**. Now Publishers, 220 pages, 2025.
- B4. Nicole Immorlica and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. **Book Chapter: Teaming up with AI – Coordination and Cooperation**. AI Economy Institute, Wiley Inc., forthcoming 2026.

(II). Refereed Papers in Conference Proceedings

- C1. Uriel Feige and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. A Direct Reduction from k -Player to 2-Player Approximate Nash Equilibrium. *International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)*, Springer, 138-149. Athens, Greece, October 2010.
- C2. Matthias Englert, Anupam Gupta, Robert Krauthgamer, Harald Räcke, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Kunal Talwar. Vertex Sparsifiers: New Results from Old Techniques. *International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms (APPROX)*, Springer, 152-165. Barcelona, Spain, September 2010.
- C3. Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Qiqi Yan. Supply-Limiting Mechanisms. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 844-861. Valencia, Spain, June 2012.

- C4. Hu Fu, Patrick Jordan, Mohammad Mahdian, Uri Nadav, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Sergei Vassilvitskii. Ad Auctions with Data. *International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)*, Springer, 168-179. Barcelona, Spain, October 2012.
- Also appeared in *IEEE INFOCOM NetEcon Workshop*, 184-189. Orlando, FL, USA, March 2012.
- C5. Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 767-784. Philadelphia, PA, USA, June 2013.
- C6. Mukund Sundararajan and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Prediction and Welfare in Ad Auctions. *International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)*, Springer, 267-278. Patra, Greece, October 2014.
- C7. Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Modularity and Greed in Double Auctions. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 241-258. Stanford, CA, USA, June 2014.
- C8. Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Why Prices Need Algorithms. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 19-36. Portland, OR, USA, June 2015.
- Invited letter in *ACM SIGecom Exchanges* 14(2), 35-40, 2015.
- C9. Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Omri Weinstein. Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. *Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)*, Springer, 300-313. Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 2015.
- C10. Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap. *International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms (APPROX)*, Dagstuhl, 8:1-8:23. Paris, France, September 2016.
- C11. Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Approximate Modularity Revisited. *ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC)*, 1028-1041. Montreal, Canada, June 2017.
- C12. Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg. The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 343. Cambridge, MA, USA, June 2017.
- C13. Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg. A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 323. Cambridge, MA, USA, June 2017.
- C14. Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Jan Vondrák. When Are Welfare Guarantees Robust? *International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms (APPROX)*, Dagstuhl, 22:1-22:23. Berkeley, CA, USA, August 2017.
- C15. Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Fair Allocation through Competitive Equilibrium from Generic Incomes. *ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency (FACCT)*, 180. Atlanta, GA, USA, January 2019.
- C16. Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Simple versus Optimal Contracts. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 369-387. Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 2019.
- C17. Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg. Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers. *IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)*, 249-272. Baltimore, MD, USA, November 2019.
- C18. Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. The Complexity of Contracts. *ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)*, 2688-2707. Salt Lake City, UT, USA, January 2020.
- C19. Tal Alon, Magdalen R. C. Dobson, Ariel Procaccia, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Jamie Tucker-Foltz. Multiagent Evaluation Mechanisms. *AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, 1774-1781. New York, NY, USA, February 2020.
- Selected for oral presentation (top 5%).
- C20. Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Escaping cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*. Virtual conference, July 2020.
- C21. Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Ori Zviran. PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. *AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*. Virtual conference, February 2021.
- C22. Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Konstantin Zabarnyi. Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints. *AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*. Virtual conference, February 2021.
- C23. Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva Shamash and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*. Budapest, Hungary, July 2021.
- C24. Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi. Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*. Budapest, Hungary, July 2021.
- C25. Tal Alon, Paul Dütting and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*. Budapest, Hungary, July 2021.

- C26. Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Itay Eilat, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Nir Rosenfeld. Strategic Classification in the Dark. *International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*. Vienna, Austria, July 2021.
- C27. Ameer Amer and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation. *International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT)*, Aarhus, Denmark, September 2021.
- C28. Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi. Multi-Channel Bayesian Persuasion. *Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS)*. Virtual, January 2022.
- C29. Vineet Nair, Ganesh Ghalme, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Nir Rosenfeld. Strategic Representation. *International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*. Baltimore, ML, USA, July 2022.
- C30. Nir Bachrach and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to Auctions. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*. Boulder, CO, USA, July 2022.
- C31. Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan and Inbal Talgam-Cohen Interdependent Public Projects. *Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)*. Florence, Italy, January 2023.
- C32. Eden Saig, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Nir Rosenfeld. Delegated Classification. *Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)*, 2023.
 - Selected for spotlight presentation.
- C33. Tonghan Wang, Paul Dütting, Dmitry Ivanov, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and David Parkes. Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Piecewise Affine Neural Networks. *Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)*, 2023.
- C34. Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, Yingkai Li and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 2023.
- C35. Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Konstantin Zabarnyi. Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 2023.
- C36. Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi. Algorithmic Cheap Talk. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 2024.
- C37. Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi. Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 2024.
- C38. Guru Guruganesh, Yoav Kolumbus, Jon Schneider, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Manolis Vlatakis, Josh Wang and Matt Weinberg. Contracting with a Learning Agent. *Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)*, 2024.
- C39. Eden Saig, Ohad Einav and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Incentivizing Quality Text Generation via Statistical Contracts. *Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)*, 2024.
 - Also selected for oral presentation as Statistical Contracts for Inventivizing GenAI at Economics of Modern ML: Markets, Incentives, and Generative AI Workshop, *AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)*, 2025.
 - Selected for Highlights Beyond EC, 2026.
- C40. Zohar Barak, Anupam Gupta and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. MAC Advice for Facility Location Mechanism Design. *Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)*, 2024.
- C41. Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Tomer Ezra, Yingkai Li and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. *Multi-Project Contracts*. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 2025.
- C42. Gil Aharoni, Martin Hoefer and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Welfare and Beyond in Multi-Agent Contracts. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 2025.
- C43. Batya Berzack, Rotem Oshman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Dynamic Rental Games with Stagewise Individual Rationality. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 2025.
- C44. Elad Lavi, Hadas Shachnai and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Online Contract Design. *International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)*, 2026 (forthcoming).
- C45. Ilan Doron-Arad, Hadas Shachnai, Gilad Shmerler and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. An Algorithm-to-Contract Framework without Demand Queries. *ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, 2026.
- C46. Eden Saig, Tamar Garbuz, Ariel D. Procaccia, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Jamie Tucker-Foltz. Adaptive Contracts for Cost-Effective AI Delegation. *International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*, 2026.
 - Selected for Highlights Beyond EC, 2026.

(III). Journal Articles

- J1. Matthias Englert, Anupam Gupta, Robert Krauthgamer, Harald Räcke, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Kunal Talwar. Vertex Sparsifiers: New Results from Old Techniques. *SIAM Journal on Computing* 43(4), 1239-1262, 2014.
- J2. Mukund Sundararajan and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Prediction and Welfare in Ad Auctions. *Springer Theory of Computing Systems* 59(4) (Special Issue on Algorithmic Game Theory - by invitation), 664-682, 2016.
- J3. Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values. *ACM Trans. Economics and Comput.* 4(3) (Special Issue on EC'13 - by invitation), 18:1-18:34, 2016.
- J4. Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Modularity and Greed in Double Auctions. *Games and Economic Behavior (GEB)* 105, 59-83, 2017.
- J5. Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Approximate Modularity Revisited. *SIAM Journal on Computing* 49(1), 67-97, 2019.
- J6. Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Qiqi Yan. Robust Auctions for Revenue via Enhanced Competition. *Operations Research* 68(4):1074-1094, 2019.
- J7. Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design. *Annual Review of Economics* 11 (by invitation), 355-381, 2019.
- J8. Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets. *Mathematics of Operations Research* 46(1):28-60, 2021.
- J9. Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and S. Matthew Weinberg. A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. *Operations Research* 69(1):188-206, 2021.
- J10. Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. The Complexity of Contracts. *SIAM Journal on Computing* 50(1):211-254, 2021.
- J11. Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi. Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion. *Games and Economic Behavior (GEB)* 136:226-348, 2022.
- J12. Oren Bar-Gill, Cass Sunstein and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Algorithmic Harm in Consumer Markets. *Journal of Legal Analysis* 15(1):1-47, 2023.
 - Selected for Highlights Beyond EC, 2023.
 - Selected for oral presentation at ACM Conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO), 2023.
- J13. Yotam Gafni, Xin Huang, Ron Lavi and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via Copies. *ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)* 11(3-4):1-27, 2023.
 - Also appeared in *Workshop on Computational Social Choice (COMSOC)*. Virtual, June 2021.
- J14. Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva Shamash and Inbal Talgam-Cohen. Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. Technical Note in *Operations Research (OR)* 72(1):288-299, 2024.
- J15. Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen and Konstantin Zabarnyi. A Random Dictator Is All You Need. *American Economics Journal: Microeconomics (AEJMicro)* 17(1):66-96, 2024.
- J16. Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu and Konstantin Zabarnyi. Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem. *Games and Economic Behavior (GEB)* 155:55-69, 2026.